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Coalition Formation Games for Collaborative
Spectrum Sensing
Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Bas¸ar, Me´rouane Debbah, and Are Hjørungnes
Abstract—Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) between sec-
ondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks exhibits an inherent
tradeoff between minimizing the probability of missing the
detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a reasonable
false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining a good spectrum
utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff
on the network structure and the cooperative incentives of
the SUs that seek to cooperate for improving their detection
performance. We model the CSS problem as a non-transferable
coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms for
coalition formation. First, we construct a distributed coalition
formation (CF) algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize
into disjoint coalitions while accounting for the CSS tradeoff.
Then, the CF algorithm is complemented with a coalitional
voting game for enabling distributed coalition formation with
detection probability guarantees (CF-PD) when required by the
PU. The CF-PD algorithm allows the SUs to form minimal
winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e., coalitions that achieve the target
detection probability with minimal costs. For both algorithms,
we study and prove various properties pertaining to network
structure, adaptation to mobility and stability. Simulation results
show that CF reduces the average probability of miss per SU up
to 88.45% relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining
a desired false alarm. For CF-PD, the results show that up to
87.25% of the SUs achieve the required detection probability
through MWCs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a surge in wireless services,
yielding a huge demand on the radio spectrum. However, the
spectrum resources are scarce and most of them have been
already licensed to existing operators. Various studies have
shown that the actual licensed spectrum remains unoccupied
for large periods [1]. For efficiently exploiting these spectrum
holes, cognitive radio has been proposed [2]. By monitoring
and adapting to the environment, cognitive radios (secondary
users (SUs)) can share the spectrum with the licensed user
(primary user (PU)), operating whenever the PU is not using
the spectrum. However, deploying and implementing such
flexible SUs faces several challenges [3] at different levels
such as spectrum access [3]–[5] and spectrum sensing [6]–
[15]. Spectrum sensing mainly deals with the stage during
which the cognitive users attempt to learn their environment
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prior to accessing and sharing the spectrum. For instance, the
SUs must constantly sense the spectrum in order to detect the
presence of the PU and use the spectrum holes without causing
harmful interference to the PU. Hence, efficient and distributed
spectrum sensing is of utter importance and constitutes a major
challenge in cognitive radio networks.
For sensing the PU presence, the SUs must be able to detect
its signal using various kinds of detectors such as energy
detectors or others [6]. However, the performance of spectrum
sensing is significantly affected by the degradation of the PU
signal due to path loss or shadowing (hidden terminal). It
has been shown that, through collaborative spectrum sens-
ing (CSS) among SUs, the effects of this hidden terminal prob-
lem can be reduced and the probability of detecting the PU can
be improved [7]–[10], [12]–[15]. In [7], the SUs collaborate
by sharing their sensing decisions through a centralized fusion
center which combines the SUs’ sensing bits using the OR-
rule for data fusion. A similar approach is used in [9] using
different decision-combining methods. In [10], it is shown
that, in CSS, soft decisions can have an almost comparable
performance with hard decisions while reducing complexity.
The authors in [12] propose an evolutionary game model for
CSS in order to inspect the strategies of the SUs and their
contribution to the sensing process. The effect of the sensing
time on the access performance of the SUs in a cognitive
network is analyzed in [11]. For improving the performance
of CSS, spatial diversity techniques are presented in [13] as a
means for combatting the error probability due to fading on the
reporting channel between the SUs and the central fusion cen-
ter. Other interesting performance aspects of spectrum sensing
and CSS are studied in [8], [14]–[18]. Existing literature
mainly focused on the performance assessment of CSS in the
presence of a centralized fusion center that combines all the
SUs bits. In practice, the SUs can be at different locations
in the network, and, thus, prefer to form nearby groups for
CSS without relying on a centralized entity. Moreover, the
SUs can belong to different service providers and need to
interact with each other for CSS, instead of relaying their bits
to a centralized fusion center which may not even exist in an
ad hoc network of SUs. In addition, a centralized approach
requires the deployment and/or re-use of an infrastructure for
the purpose of spectrum sensing, which is quite impractical
as many secondary networks are inherently ad hoc. Further,
the use of a centralized spectrum sensing approach can yield a
significant overhead and complexity, notably in networks with
a large number of SUs having varying locations.
The main contribution of this paper is to devise distributed
strategies for CSS between the SUs in a cognitive network
which capture the spectrum sensing objectives of these SUs. A
further contribution of this paper is to inspect how the network
structure can evolve and change as a result of the cooperative
2incentives of the SUs seeking to improve their spectrum
sensing performance, given the inherent tradeoff that exists
between the CSS gains in terms of reducing the probability
of missing the detection of the PU and the cooperation costs
in terms of maintaining a reasonable false alarm probability
(e.g., to maintain an efficient spectrum utilization). We model
the CSS problem as a non-transferable coalitional game and
we propose a distributed coalition formation (CF) algorithm.
Using CF, each SU autonomously decides to form or leave
a coalition while maximizing its utility in terms of detection
probability and accounting for the false alarm cost. We show
that, due to the cost for cooperation, independent disjoint coali-
tions will form in the network and a maximum coalition size
exists for the proposed utility model. For cognitive networks
where the PU imposes a detection probability level on the
SUs, we propose a distributed coalition formation algorithm
with detection probability guarantees (CF-PD) which is built
by overlaying a coalitional voting game on the CF algorithm.
The CF-PD algorithm enables the SUs to autonomously take
the decision to form minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e.,
coalitions that achieve the target detection probability with
minimal costs. Through simulations, we assess the perfor-
mance of both algorithms relative to the non-cooperative case,
we compare the results with a centralized solution, and we
show how the SUs can self-organize and adapt the network
structure to environmental changes such as mobility.
Note that, although some existing literature such as [19] and
[20] have dealt with the idea of forming clusters for CSS, the
objectives of [19] and [20] are different from the contributions
of our paper. For instance, [19] studies, in the context of the
centralized fusion center based CSS, the possibility of using
clusters for combatting the errors on the reporting channel.
However, the authors do not deal with the idea of distributed
CSS and, as clearly stated in [19, Section III], the paper does
not propose any algorithm for forming the clusters, instead it
assumes that the clusters are pre-formed. Moreover, [19] does
not account for the tradeoff between the probabilities of miss
and false alarm, which impacts the size and identities of the
SUs that will form coalitions or clusters. In this context, our
paper complements [19] by having a number of different and
novel contributions as discussed in the previous paragraph.
Further, in [20], the authors focus on studying the perfor-
mance of CSS in a geographical area, using different detection
techniques such as energy detection or feature detection. The
idea of clustering in [20] is restricted to dividing, based on
the received signal strength of the PU, a large geographical
area into a number of defined clusters which are geographical
areas with a large radius, i.e., analogous to the cells of a
wireless cellular system. Within every cluster or cell, the
work in [20] considers that a large number of SUs exist and
these SUs utilize the traditional network-wide fusion center
solution at cell-level. Moreover, in [20], no target probability
of miss or false alarm constraints are taken into account. In
short, [20] does not look at distributed strategies enabling
the SUs to, autonomously, form coalitions while optimizing
their probability of miss given a false alarm constraint. In
essence, our approach complements the work done in [20].
For instance, given a cognitive network deployed in a large
geographical area, one can first cluster it geographically into
cells using the approach [20] and, then, our proposed coalition
formation approach can be applied by the SUs inside each
cluster or cell.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model. In Section III, we present the pro-
posed coalitional game and prove different properties while in
Section IV we devise a distributed algorithm for autonomous
coalition formation. Section V extends the coalition formation
algorithm to accommodate probability of detection guarantees.
In Section VI, we discuss implementation aspects in practical
cognitive networks. Simulation results are presented and ana-
lyzed in Section VII. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section
VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network consisting of N transmit-receive pairs
of SUs and a single PU with N = {1, . . . , N} denoting the
set of all SUs. The SUs and the PU can be either stationary
or mobile. Throughout this paper, we assume that all SUs are
honest nodes with no malicious or cheating behavior. Since
the focus is on spectrum sensing, we are only interested in the
transmitter part of each of the N SUs. In a non-cooperative
approach, each of the N SUs continuously senses the spectrum
in order to detect the presence of the PU. For detecting the PU,
we use energy detectors which are one of the main practical
signal detectors in cognitive radio networks [7], [9], [13].
In such a non-cooperative setting with Rayleigh fading, the
probabilities of miss (i.e. probability of missing the detection
of the PU) and false alarm for an SU i are, respectively, given
by Pm,i and Pf,i [7, Eqs. (2), (4)]
Pm,i = 1− e
−λ2
m−2∑
n=0
1
n!
(
λ
2
)n
+
(
1 + γ¯i,PU
γ¯i,PU
)m−1
×
[
e
− λ
2(1+γ¯i,PU) − e−
λ
2
m−2∑
n=0
1
n!
(
λγ¯i,PU
2(1 + γ¯i,PU )
)n]
, (1)
Pf,i = Pf =
Γ(m, λ2 )
Γ(m)
, (2)
where m is the time bandwidth product, λ is the energy
detection threshold assumed to be the same for all SUs without
loss of generality as in [7], [9], [13], Γ(·, ·) is the incomplete
gamma function and Γ(·) is the gamma function. Moreover, γ¯i
represents the average SNR of the received signal from the PU
to SU given by γ¯i,PU = PPUhPU,iσ2 with PPU the transmit power of
the PU, σ2 the Gaussian noise variance, and hPU,i = κ/dµPU,i
the path loss between the PU and SU i, κ is the path loss
constant, µ the path loss exponent, and dPU,i is the distance
between the PU and SU i.
The expression in (1) averages out the effect of the small-
scale fading, and, thus, in the remainder of this paper, we
only deal with large-scale fading effects, e.g., due to path loss.
Further, it is also important to note that the non-cooperative
false alarm probability expression depends solely on the de-
tection threshold λ and does not depend on the SU’s location;
hence, we dropped the subscript i in (2). Note that we do not
account for the shadowing effect, however, in future work, (1)
can be modified to take into account this effect as shown in
[3], [7], [9]. Moreover, an important metric is the probability
3of detection of the PU by a SU i, which is simply defined as
Pd,i = 1− Pm,i.
In order to minimize the interference on the PU and reduce
the probability of miss, the SUs can cooperate by forming
coalitions. Within each coalition S ⊆ N , an SU designated as
coalition head, collects the sensing bits from the coalition’s
SUs and acts as a fusion center in order to make a coalition-
based decision on the presence or absence of the PU. This
can be seen as having the centralized CSS of [7], [13] applied
at the level of each coalition with the coalition head being
the fusion center to which all the coalition members report.
For combining the sensing bits and making the final detection
decision, the coalition head uses the decision fusion OR-rule
such as in [7], [13]. For a coalition S having coalition head
k ∈ S, using CSS, the miss and false alarm probabilities are,
respectively, given by [13]
Qm,S =
∏
i∈S
[Pm,i(1− Pe,i,k) + (1 − Pm,i)Pe,i,k] , (3)
Qf,S = 1−
∏
i∈S
[(1− Pf )(1− Pe,i,k) + PfPe,i,k] , (4)
where Pm,i, Pf are given by (1), (2), and Pe,i,k is the
probability of error due to the fading on the reporting channel
between the SU i of coalition S and the coalition head k.
The error over the reporting channel is an important metric
that affects the performance of CSS in terms of probability of
miss as well as false alarm as demonstrated in [13]. The main
idea is that, whenever an SU needs to report its sensing bit to
the coalition head, the coalition head might receive this bit in
error due to the fading over the wireless channel between the
SU and the coalition head. This reporting error Pe,i,k , between
an SU i and the coalition head k, increases the probability
of miss and increases the false alarm as shown in in (3)
and (4). Inside any coalition S, assuming BPSK modulation
in Rayleigh fading environments, the average probability of
reporting error between SU i ∈ S and the coalition head k ∈ S
is given by [21]
Pe,i,k =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯i,k
1 + γ¯i,k
)
, (5)
where γ¯i,k = Pihi,kσ2 is the average SNR for bit reporting
between SU i and the coalition head k inside S with Pi the
transmit power of SU i used for reporting the sensing bit to
k and hi,k = κdµ
i,k
the path loss between SU i and coalition
head k. Any SU can be chosen as a coalition head within a
coalition. However, for the remainder of this paper, we adopt
the following convention without loss of generality.
Convention 1: Within a coalition S, the SU k ∈ S having
the lowest non-cooperative probability of miss Pm,k is chosen
as coalition head. Hence, the coalition head k of a coalition
S is given by k ∈ argmin
i∈S
Pm,i with Pm,i given by (1)1.
The motivation behind Convention 1 is that, due to the error
on the reporting channel, whenever an SU needs to report its
sensing bit to a coalition head, there is a potential “risk” that
1Note that, if more than one SU in a coalition achieves the minimum
probability of miss, then, the coalition head is picked at random among the
set of SUs with minimum probability of miss.
the bit is received in error as per (3)-(5). This risk motivates the
adoption of Convention 1 whereby the SU with minimum non-
cooperative miss probability, i.e., the SU with the best channel
towards the PU, is used as a coalition head, and, thus, does not
need to send its bit (which is the most reliable in the coalition)
to other SUs in the coalition and risk the reception of this bit
in error, subsequently, affecting the performance in terms of
probability of miss and false alarm. It must be noted that the
analysis and algorithm discussed in the remainder of this paper
can accommodate other coalition head selection approaches
(e.g., select the SU closest to the center of a coalition).
It should be clear from (3) and (4) that as the number
of SUs per coalition increases, the probability of miss will
decrease while the probability of false alarm will increase.
This is a crucial tradeoff in CSS that can have a major impact
on the collaboration strategies of each SU. Thus, our objective
is to characterize the network structure that will form when
the SUs collaborate while accounting for this tradeoff. An
example of the sought network structure is shown in Fig. 1.
Finding the optimal coalition structure, such as in Fig. 1,
using a centralized approach requires finding the partition of
the set that minimizes the average probability of miss per
SU, while maintaining a false alarm constraint per SU. For
instance, in the centralized approach, the optimization problem
aims at minimizing the overall system’s average probability
of miss per SU given a constraint on the average false alarm
probability per SU. In other words, denoting B as the set of
all partitions of N , the centralized approach seeks to solve
the following optimization problem
min
T ∈B
∑
S∈T |S| ·Qm,S
N
, s.t. Qf,S ≤ α ∀ S ∈ T ,
where | · | represents the cardinality of a set operator and S
is a coalition belonging to the partition T . Note that, in this
centralized optimization problem it is considered that the false
alarm probability constraint per SU directly maps to a false
alarm probability constraint per coalition which will be more
formally demonstrated in the next section through Property 1.
However, it is shown in [22] that finding the optimal coali-
tion structure in a centralized manner leads to an optimization
problem which is NP-complete. This is mainly due to the fact
that the number of possible coalition structures (partitions),
is given by a value known as the Bell number which grows
exponentially with N [23]. Moreover, in a centralized partition
search approach, the objective is typically to optimize the
overall system performance while ignoring the individual
preferences and payoffs of the SUs (or coalition of SUs).
Hence, for the centralized approach, a particular SU might
be asked to be part of a coalition S1 even if this SU, based
on its own payoff, prefers to be part of another coalition
S2. Since the SUs act independently and are typically self-
interested, they should be given the choice of making their
coalition formation decisions on their own. Hence, there is
a motivation to devise distributed approaches for the SUs
to make autonomous decisions, self-organize, and form the
coalitional structure.
4Fig. 1. An illustrative example of coalition formation for collaborative
spectrum sensing among SUs.
III. COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING AS
COALITIONAL GAME
A. Game Formulation and Properties
For devising suitable cooperative strategies for CSS among
the SUs, we refer to coalitional game theory [24]–[26]. We
model distributed CSS as a coalitional game with a non-
transferable utility which is defined as follows [24]2
Definition 1: A coalitional game with non-transferable util-
ity (NTU) is defined by a pair (N , V ) where N is the set
of players and V is a mapping such that for every coalition
S ⊆ N , V (S) is a closed convex subset of RS that contains
the payoff vectors that players in S can achieve.
In other words, a coalitional game (N , V ) is said to be
with NTU if the value or utility of a coalition cannot be
arbitrarily apportioned between the coalition’s players. Hence,
the value of any coalition S can be mapped to a set V of payoff
vectors. First, we define the value (utility) v(S) of a coalition
S ⊆ N as a function that captures the tradeoff between the
probability of detection and the probability of false alarm.
For this purpose, v(S) must be an increasing function of the
detection probability Qd,S = 1−Qm,S within coalition S and
a decreasing function of the false alarm probability Qf,S as
follows.
v(S)=Qd,S−C(Qf,S , αS)=(1 −Qm,S)−C(Qf,S, αS), (6)
where Qm,S is the probability of miss for coalition S given by
(3) and C(Qf,S , αS) is a cost function which depends on the
false alarm probability Qf,S and on a false alarm constraint
αS that S must not exceed when it forms. Without loss of
generality, we assume αS = α, ∀S ⊆ N .
In a coalitional game, one has to distinguish between two
distinct quantities: The value function and the payoff. Given
a coalition S, the value function v(S) describes the overall
utility that the entire coalition S receives when its acting
cooperatively. In contrast, for any SU i ∈ S the payoff φi(S)
2This is the general definition of an NTU game as per [24], [25], some
literature may append other properties to the definition which are not useful
for the game class dealt with in this paper (for more information on the various
definitions of an NTU game see [24]–[26]).
describes the utility that SU i receives when acting as part of
S. Hence, φi(S) represents the tradeoff between probability
of miss and probability of false alarm that SU i achieves when
acting as part of coalition S. In the proposed CSS game, we
have the following property:
Property 1: The probabilities of miss and false alarm for
any SU i ∈ S are given by the probabilities of miss and false
alarm of coalition S in (3) and (4), respectively. Hence, in
the proposed CSS game, the payoff, φi(S), of any SU i ∈ S
is simply equal to the value of the coalition, i.e., φi(S) =
v(S), ∀ i ∈ S. As a result, the false alarm constraint per
coalition α maps to a false alarm constraint per SU.
This property is an immediate result of the operation of CSS
whereby the SUs belonging to a coalition S will transmit or
not based on the final coalition head decision after data fusion.
Thus, the miss and false alarm probabilities of any SU i ∈ S
are the miss and false alarm probabilities of the coalition S to
which i belongs as given by Qm,S and Qf,S in (3) and (4),
respectively. As an immediate consequence of this property,
we notice that, in the proposed CSS game, the value of a
coalition, i.e., v(S), is not divisible among the SUs since the
payoff of every SU in S is equal to v(S) (and not to a fraction
of v(S)). Hence, the proposed CSS game can be modeled as a
coalitional game (N , V ) with NTU where V (S) is a singleton
set,
V (S) = {φ(S) ∈ RS | φi(S) = v(S), ∀i ∈ S}, (7)
with v(S) given by (6). (N , V ) is clearly an NTU game since
the set V (S) is a singleton, and hence closed and convex.
In a coalitional game with no cost, the main interest would
be in characterizing the properties and stability of the grand
coalition of all players since it is generally assumed that
the grand coalition maximizes the utilities of the players
[24] (in such a no cost case, concepts such as the core are
suitable solutions and additional properties for V may be
required). However, for the proposed (N , V ) game, although
CSS improves the detection probability for the SUs, the false
alarm costs limit this gain, and thus, we remark the following:
Remark 1: For the proposed (N , V ) coalitional game, the
grand coalition of all the SUs seldom forms due to the
false alarm costs resulting from cooperation. Instead, disjoint
independent coalitions form in the network.
By inspecting Qm,S in (3) and through the results shown in
[7], [13] (for centralized CSS) it is clear that, as the number
of SUs in a coalition increases, Qm,S decreases and the
performance improves. Hence, when no cost for collaboration
exists, the grand coalition of all SUs is the optimal structure
for maximizing the detection probability. However, when the
number of SUs in a coalition S increases, through (3), the
false alarm probability increases and can exceed the constraint
α, hence giving no incentive for large coalitions to form and
affecting the collaboration strategies of the SUs. Therefore,
for the proposed CSS model with cost for collaboration, the
grand coalition of all SUs will seldom form due to the false
alarm cost and constraint as accounted for in (6). Due to this
property, we deal with a class of coalitional games known
as coalition formation games [25]. Hence, the solution for the
5proposed (N , V ) CSS coalition formation game is the network
structure which can characterize the CSS trade off between
gains (probability of miss) and costs (false alarm).
B. Cost Function
Any well designed cost function C(Qf,S , α) in (6) must
satisfy several requirements for adequately modeling the false
alarm. On one hand, C(Qf,S , α) must be an increasing
function of Qf,S with the slope becoming steeper as Qf,S
increases. On the other hand, C(Qf,S , α) must impose a
maximum tolerable false alarm probability α that cannot be
exceeded by any SU (as per Property 1, imposing a false alarm
constraint on the coalition maps to a constraint per SU). A
well suited cost function satisfying these requirements is the
logarithmic barrier penalty function given by [27]
C(Qf,S , α) =

−α
2 · log
(
1−
(
Qf,S
α
)2)
, if Qf,S < α,
+∞, if Qf,S ≥ α,
(8)
where log is the natural logarithm and α is the false alarm
constraint per coalition. The cost function in (8) incurs a
penalty which is increasing with the false alarm probability.
Moreover, it imposes a maximum false alarm probability α
per coalition (per SU by Property 1). In addition, as the
false alarm probability gets closer to α, the collaboration
cost increases steeply, requiring a significant improvement in
detection probability if the SUs wish to collaborate as per (6).
Note that the proposed cost function depends on both distance
and the number of SUs in the coalition, through the false alarm
probability Qf,S (the distance lies within the probability of
error). Hence, the cost for collaboration increases with the
number of SUs in the coalition as well as when the distance
between the coalition’s SUs increases.
IV. COALITION FORMATION GAMES IN CSS
A. Distributed Coalition Formation Algorithm (CF)
Coalition formation is a branch of game theory that inves-
tigates algorithms for studying the coalitional structures that
form in a network where there is a cost for forming coalitions
and where the grand coalition is not optimal [22], [25],
[26], [28]. For constructing a distributed coalition formation
algorithm for CSS, we use the following concepts [25], [28].
Definition 2: A collection S is the set S = {S1, . . . , Sl}
of mutually disjoint coalitions Si ⊆ N . If the collection spans
all the players of N , i.e.,
⋃l
j=1 Sj = N , the collection is a
partition of N .
Definition 3: A comparison relation ⊲ is defined for
comparing two collections R = {R1, . . . , Rl} and S =
{S1, . . . , Sm} that are partitions of the same subset A ⊆ N
(same players in R and S). Thus, R⊲S implies that the way
R partitions A is preferred to the way S partitions A based
on criteria defined next.
Various criteria (referred to as orders) can be used as
comparison relations between collections or partitions [25],
[28]. Due to the non-transferable nature of the proposed
(N , V ) CSS game, an individual value order that compares the
individual payoffs of the players must be used as a comparison
relation⊲. An adequate individual value order that can be used
in CSS is the Pareto order [25], [28]. Denote for a collection
R = {R1, . . . , Rl}, the utility of a player j in a coalition
Rj ∈ R by φj(R) = φj(Rj) = v(Rj) (Property 1); the
Pareto order is defined as
R⊲ S ⇐⇒ {φj(R) ≥ φj(S) ∀ j ∈ R,S}, (9)
with at least one strict inequality (>) for a player k.
Using the Pareto order as a comparison relation, we propose
a distributed coalition formation algorithm based on two rules
called “merge” and “split” that allow to modify a partition T
of the SUs set N as follows [28].
Definition 4: Merge Rule - Merge any set of coali-
tions {S1, . . . , Sl} where {∪lj=1Sj}⊲{S1, . . . , Sl}; therefore,
{S1, . . . , Sl} → {∪lj=1Sj}.
Definition 5: Split Rule - Split any coalition ∪lj=1Sj
where {S1, . . . , Sl} ⊲ {∪lj=1Sj}; thus, {∪lj=1Sj} →
{S1, . . . , Sl}.
Using the above rules, multiple coalitions can interact,
taking the decision to merge or split based on the comparison
relation ⊲. For the Pareto order, coalitions decide to merge
(split) only if at least one SU is able to strictly improve its
individual utility through this merge (split) process without
decreasing the other SUs’ utilities. Therefore, the merge rule
by Pareto order is a binding agreement among the SUs to
operate together in the sensing phase if it is beneficial for them;
and this agreement is partially reversible; i.e., can be reversed
only by an agreement to split. Note that, coalition formation
entails algorithms where agreements can be either irreversible,
partially reversible, or fully reversible [26]. As the algorithms
become more reversible, their complexity and implementation
can increase while their flexibility improves and this motivates
using a partially reversible algorithm such as the one we
propose which has a balance between implementation and
flexibility [26]. The use of these rules for CSS is described in
details further in this section.
As a consequence, for the proposed CSS game, we build
a distributed coalition formation (CF) algorithm based on
merge-and-split and it is divided into three phases: Discovery,
adaptive coalition formation, and coalition sensing. In the
first phase, each SU discovers neighboring SUs as well as
information required for performing coalition formation, e.g.,
distance to the PU and the distance of neighboring SUs. The
discovery phase is discussed in details in Subsection VI-A.
Following the discovery phase, adaptive coalition formation
begins and the SUs (or existing coalitions of SUs) interact in
order to assess whether to cooperate for sharing their sensing
results with discovered coalitions. For this purpose, an iteration
of sequential merge-and-split rules occurs in the network,
whereby each coalition decides to merge (or split) depending
on the utility improvement. In this phase, as time evolves
and SUs (or the PU) move, the SUs can autonomously self-
organize and adapt the network’s structure through new merge-
and-split iterations with each coalition taking the decision to
merge (or split) subject to satisfying the merge (or split) rule
through Pareto order (9). In the final coalition sensing phase,
once the network partition converges following merge-and-
6TABLE I
ONE ROUND OF THE PROPOSED CF ALGORITHM.
Initial State
The network is partitioned by T = {T1, . . . , Tk} (At the beginning
of all time T = N = {1, . . . , N} with non-cooperative SUs).
Three phases in each round of the CF algorithm
Phase 1 - Discovery:
Each SU (or coalition of SUs) discovers its neighboring
coalitions as per Subsection VI-A.
Phase 2 - Adaptive Coalition Formation:
In this phase, coalition formation using merge-and-split occurs.
repeat
a) F = Merge(T ); coalitions in T decide to merge based
on the merge algorithm explained in Subsection IV-A.
b) T = Split(F ); coalitions in F decide to split based on
the Pareto order.
until merge-and-split converges.
Phase 3 - Coalition Sensing:
a) Each SU reports its sensing bit to the coalition head.
b) The coalition head of each coalition makes a final decision on
the absence or presence of the PU using decision fusion OR-rule.
c) The SUs in a coalition abide by the final decision made by the
coalition head.
The above phases are repeated periodically throughout the net-
work operation. In Phase 2, through distributed merge-and-split
decisions, the SUs can autonomously adapt the network structure
to environmental changes such as mobility.
split, SUs that belong to the same coalition report their local
sensing bits to their local coalition head. The coalition head
subsequently uses decision fusion OR-rule [7], [12], [13] to
make a final decision on the presence or the absence of the
PU. This decision is then reported by the coalition heads to
all the SUs within their respective coalitions. One round of
the CF algorithm is summarized in Table I and the detailed
operation is as follows:
Each round of the three phases of the CF algorithm of Ta-
ble I starts from an initial network partition T0 = {T1, . . . , Tl}
of N . Following neighbor discovery each coalition Ti ∈ T0
can acquire the following information (see Subsection VI-A
for details):
• The probabilities of miss of the SUs in Ti, i.e., each SU
in Ti is aware of its own probability of miss.
• The existence of other coalitions with whom a potential
cooperation can be done. Hence, each coalition Ti ∈ T0
would have a list of all other potential coalitions with
whom a cooperation is possible.
• The distances between the SUs in Ti and the SUs in the
discovered coalitions.
Following the acquisition of this information through the
discovery phase, the adaptive coalition formation phase of
the algorithm begins and consists of the merge and split
procedures. During the merge procedure, each SU (or coalition
of SUs that would form afterwards) engages in pairwise
negotiations (i.e., one-on-one) with discovered neighbors, over
a control channel. One example of such a control channel
is the ad hoc temporary control channel [29] that can be
temporarily established by each SU (or coalition) for the
purpose of negotiations (these temporary control channels are
widely used in ad hoc networks [29] and, more recently, in
cognitive networks [29]–[32]). By signalling over the control
channels, two coalitions (or SUs) can inform each other of the
identities of their members (e.g., the identity can be defined by
the member’s position in space) and, in the event of a potential
merge, can decide to join together into a single coalition. For
example, at the beginning of all time, when all the network is
non-cooperative, following neighbor discovery, each SU i ∈ N
can, over a control channel, start negotiating, in a pairwise
manner with other discovered SUs. When negotiating with a
discovered coalition or SU, SU i can send its information and
an intent to merge over the control channel. Subsequently,
depending on the Pareto order as per (9), the other coalition
can respond with its own information and an approval or denial
of the merge.
Essentially, the merge process occurs as follows: Given
partition T0, each coalition Ti ∈ T0 negotiates over a control
channel (e.g., through its coalition head) with the list of neigh-
bors for assessing a potential merge. Proceeding sequentially
through the list of discovered neighbors, each coalition head
k ∈ Ti, attempts to merge with one of discovered neighbors
Tdisc (at the beginning of all time all the discovered neighbors
are non-cooperative SUs) as follows (the sequence of this
procedure is assumed to be arbitrary depending on which
neighbor was first discovered):
1) Coalition head k ∈ Ti, ∀Ti ∈ T0 signals an intent to
merge with Tdisc by sending, over the control channel,
the information (probabilities of miss and distance esti-
mates) on its own coalition, i.e., Ti, to one of the SUs
in the coalition Tdisc.
2) The SU in Tdisc which receives this information, com-
putes, in cooperation with the members of its coalition
Tdisc, the potential probability of miss that would result
from the merge with Ti as per (3), and, following this
computation, coalition Tdisc would respond to k with one
of the following results:
• If the Pareto order as per (9) is not verified, i.e., the
merger would decrease the payoff of one or more
of the coalition members in Ti or Tdisc, then Tdisc
responds with a small packet signalling the failure
of the merger as well as providing information on
its current members. The information on the current
members allows k and Ti to get a better idea of the
existing partition for future merge decisions.
• If the Pareto order as per (9) is verified, i.e., coop-
eration improves the payoffs of the involved SUs,
then Tdisc responds with a small packet signalling
the acceptance of the merger as well as providing
information on its current members. Subsequently,
the two coalitions would merge into a new coalition
Tnew ∪ Tdisc and they would be aware of each other
following the negotiations phase. Subsequently, the
new coalition Tnew would repeat the above proce-
dure, given the union of the lists of neighbors from
Ti and Tdisc.
3) Coalition Ti continues the above procedure until it
merges or until no further merge possibility exist.
Hence, two coalitions would merge through negotiations over
a control channel, and they can inform each others of the
identities of their members through this channel when the
7merge procedure above is taking place. Note that, although
we consider that the order in which the SUs discover their
neighbors (and goes through them for merge) is arbitrary, one
can always define other metrics such as the average distance
between the members which can be used as a distance between
coalitions and, subsequently, used to order the discovered
neighbors. In many cases, from the perspective of a coalition
S, any neighbor discovery algorithm is likely to find coalitions
whose members are at a closer distance from the members of
S, before those who are located far away.
Moreover, the aforementioned procedure shows that, in
general, the SUs do not need to estimate the probability of
miss of their neighbors. In contrast, during the pairwise merge
search, each SU (or coalition) would append the values of
the probabilities of miss of its members along with the intent
to merge message that is sent to one of its neighbors. In
response, the neighbor can communicate, along with the merge
decision, the information on the probability of miss of its
members3. Certainly, we assume that each SU is aware of
its own probability of miss and the methods that each SU can
use to find its own probability of miss are discussed in details
in Subsection VI-A. Note that, once the SUs of two coalitions
exchange their probabilities of miss, they would be able to
work out which member is potentially the coalition head as
per Convention 1.
Following the merge process, the coalitions are next subject
to split operations, if any is possible. Hence, any coalition
which can no longer merge would start to apply the split oper-
ation. As the members are part of the same coalition, assessing
the payoffs yielded by a split form is easily performed since
the members are aware of the identities and characteristics of
their partners. An iteration consisting of multiple successive
merge-and-split operations is repeated until it terminates (the
convergence of an algorithm constructed using merge-and-split
rules is guaranteed [28]). It must be stressed that the merge or
split decisions are taken in a distributed way without relying
on any centralized entity as each SU or coalition makes its
own merge or split decisions.
The merge-and-split procedure of Phase 2 is performed
sequentially for all coalitions in the network, in a certain
order (in practice there is always a fraction of time of
difference between the action of a coalition/SU or the next one,
which dictates an order of operation). The order in which the
coalitions/SUs act is considered arbitrary which is often the
case in a practical cognitive network. As a result, any arbitrary
SU (or coalition) can initiate the merge and split procedures.
Hence, once the SUs have operated non-cooperatively for a
while and performed the discovery phase, they would start, in
an arbitrary order, to perform coalition formation in Phase 2
through merge-and-split. In general, all SUs will always have
an incentive to seek cooperation since it might improve
their payoff. Nonetheless, the proposed algorithm is always
applicable regardless of the order in which the SUs/coalitions
act, and, thus, a network operator can impose a certain order
for coalition formation on its SUs if needed (e.g., let the SU
3In case the SUs, using the techniques of Subsection VI-A, are able to
estimate the probability of miss of their neighbors, they may be able to reduce
the information exchange overhead.
with worst or best performance start and so on).
Further, it is interesting to note that, under certain conditions
(see Subsection IV-B and Lemma 1) on the network partition,
the order of operation does not affect the final structure that
will form in the network. Nonetheless, even when different
orders can yield different networks structures, due to the
definition of the merge and split operation through the Pareto
order in (9), it is always ensured that, any resulting partition
would improve the payoffs of the SUs as compared to the
previous state. This is due to the fact that any merge or
split agreement makes sure that at least one SU benefits from
this operation. Hence, the proposed merge-and-split algorithm,
independent of the order, is guaranteed to yield a cooperative
network which outperforms (or is at least as good as) the non-
cooperative approach.
For handling environmental changes such as mobility (of
the SUs or the PU) or the joining/leaving of SUs, Phase 2 of
the proposed algorithm in Table I is repeated periodically over
time. In Phase 2, periodically, as time evolves and SUs (or the
PU) move or join/leave, the SUs can take distributed decisions
to adapt the network’s structure through new merge-and-split
iterations with each coalition taking the decision to merge (or
split) subject to satisfying the merge (or split) rule through the
Pareto order in (9).
For this purpose, one can define a period of time θ which
specifies the time elapsed between two consecutive runs of
the proposed CF algorithm. Consequently, there would be
a tradeoff between the number of runs, i.e., overhead for
coalition formation and the adaptation to the dynamics of the
environment. Hence, for environments that are static or varying
very slowly, θ would be large. In contrast, for highly varying
environments, θ would have a small value, and, thus, enabling
adaptation to rapidly changing environments. The value of θ
can be regulated by the SUs depending on their observations
on the environment. For example, given an initial value of
θ = θ0, whenever the SUs notice that, during merge-and-
split, a lot of changes in the network and the partition have
occurred, they can decide to reduce θ to a value smaller than
θ0. In contrast, whenever the SUs note that few changes have
occurred, they can increase θ to a value above θ0. For example,
the possible values for the period θ can be standardized so
that the SUs would know it without the need of a centralized
controller. The above procedure would ensure the convergence
of the merge-and-split algorithm. Nonetheless, certainly, we
consider only environments where the changes during a single
run of the proposed algorithms are small enough so as not to
drastically affect the utilities, and, thus, the merge or split
decisions of the SUs. Note that, performing instantaneous
coalition formation is still a challenging task in game theory
(e.g., see [26] and references therein), and can be considered
in future extensions of this work.
It must be also noted that almost no synchronization among
the SUs is needed to perform coalition formation since the
order in which the merge-and-split operations proceed can
be arbitrary (or synchronized if an operator wishes to do
so). In some sense, the SUs would need only some kind of
quasi-synchronization for handshaking and negotiations over
the control channel to communicate their spectral sensing in-
8formation. The proposed merge-and-split CF process involves
negotiations that occur in a pairwise manner with coalitions
(or SUs) in a small neighboring area and not in the entire
network. In addition, as soon as a coalition identifies a merge
possibility, it does not need to go through the remainder of
the discovered neighbor. This aspect further corroborates the
little need for synchronization among the SUs.
In order to show that the SUs need to survey only a specific
geographical area for finding merge partners without looking
at all other possible SUs in the network, we inspect the
different merge possibilities between two SUs. In this regards,
given two SUs involved in CSS through CF, we have the
following theorem (proof is in the appendix):
Theorem 1: Two SUs i and j with non-cooperative prob-
abilities of miss Pm,i and Pm,j respectively, such as Pm,i ≤
Pm,j , can merge into one coalition if the probability of error is
below a maximum probability of error, i.e., if Pe,j,i ≤ P˜e,j,i,
where P˜e,j,i is given by the following tight approximation
P˜e,j,i ≈
Pf (Pf − 2) + α
√
(1 − (1−
P 2
f
α2
)e
Pm,i(1−η)(Pm,j−1)
α2 )
(2Pf − 1)(Pf − 1)
,
(10)
with η = α, if Pm,j ≤ 12 and η = 0 otherwise. Consequently,
a corresponding minimum distance d˜i,j between the two SUs
can be easily found by solving (5) for P˜e,j,i.
From Theorem 1, each SU i can determine merge regions,
corresponding to arcs on circles and their respective inter-
cepting angles, for forming a coalition with an SU j where
Pm,i ≤ Pm,j . For a given detection threshold λ, one can see
through (1) that each Pm,j corresponds to one circle centered
at the PU with a radius rj hence determining a class of SUs
having the same non-cooperative probability of miss. For each
such circle, an SU i maps the condition Pe,j,i ≤ P˜e,j,i to
an arc on these circles, with a corresponding intercepting
angle (angle centered at SU i) and intercepting the merge
region arc. However, for any two SUs i and j belonging to
two circles of radii ri and rj , the distance d˜i,j between the
two SUs (from Theorem 1) must satisfy d˜i,j < (rj − ri),
otherwise no merge is possible (the merge region is empty).
A detailed analysis of these merge regions, using Theorem 1,
is presented in Section VII. Note that, even if no closed form
expression exists for the upper bound P˜e,j,i, Pe,j,i will always
be bounded by a value P˜e,j,i which would be a function of
the probabilities of miss and false alarm of the two SUs. This
is a direct consequence of the fact that, whenever the error
on the reporting channel increases, it will incur an increased
probability of miss and an increased false alarm as per (3) and
(4) which, in turn, would limit the gains from cooperation and
sets an upper bound on the error level that would be tolerated
for the merge to occur.
An upper bound on the maximum coalition size is imposed
by the proposed utility and models as follows:
Theorem 2: For the proposed CSS model, given that the
SUs collaborate for improving their payoff given the tradeoff
between probability of miss and false alarm, any coalitional
structure resulting from the distributed coalition formation
algorithm will have coalitions limited in size to a maximum
of
Mmax =
log (1− α)
log (1 − Pf )
(11)
SUs.
Proof: In the proposed algorithm, the benefit from collab-
oration is limited by the false alarm probability cost modeled
by the barrier function (8). A minimum false alarm cost in
a coalition S with coalition head k ∈ S exists whenever the
reporting channel is perfect, i.e., exhibiting no error, hence,
Pe,i,k = 0 ∀i ∈ S. In this perfect case, the false alarm
probability in a perfect coalition Sp is given by
Qf,Sp = 1−
∏
i∈Sp
(1− Pf ) = 1− (1 − Pf )
|Sp|, (12)
where |Sp| is the number of SUs in the perfect coalition
Sp. A perfect coalition Sp where the reporting channels
inside are perfect (i.e., SUs are grouped very close to each
other) accommodates the largest number of SUs relative to
all other coalitions. Hence, we use this perfect coalition to
find an upper bound on the maximum number of SUs per
coalition. For instance, the log barrier function in (8) tends
to infinity whenever the false alarm constraint per coalition
is reached which implies an upper bound on the maximum
number of SUs per coalition if Qf,Sp ≥ α, yielding by (12),
|Sp| ≤
log (1−α)
log (1−Pf )
=Mmax.
It is interesting to note that the maximum size of a coalition
Mmax depends mainly on two parameters: the false alarm
constraint α and the non-cooperative false alarm Pf . For
instance, larger false alarm constraints allow larger coalitions,
as the maximum tolerable cost limit for collaboration is
increased. Moreover, as the non-cooperative false alarm Pf
decreases, the possibilities for collaboration are better since
the increase of the false alarm due to coalition size becomes
smaller as per (4). It must be noted that the dependence of
Mmax on Pf yields a direct dependence of Mmax on the
energy detection threshold λ as per (2). Finally, it is interesting
to see that the upper bound on the coalition size does not
depend on the location of the SUs in the network nor on the
actual number of SUs in the network. Therefore, deploying
more SUs or moving the SUs in the network for a fixed α
and Pf does not increase the upper bound on coalition size.
B. Partition Stability
The result of the proposed algorithm is a network partition
composed of disjoint independent coalitions of SUs. The
stability of this resulting network structure can be investigated
by a defection function D [28].
Definition 6: A defection function D is a function which
associates with each partition T of N a group of collections
in N . A partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of N is D-stable if no
group of players is interested in leaving T when the players
who leave can only form the collections allowed by D.
Two defection functions are of interest: a Dhp function
which associates with each partition T of N the group of
all partitions of N that can form by merging or splitting
coalitions in T and the Dc function which associates with
each partition T of N the group of all collections in N . Two
forms of stability stem from these definitions: Dhp stability and
a stronger Dc stability. A partition T is Dhp-stable, if, for the
partition T , no coalition has an incentive to split or merge. As
9an immediate result of the definition of Dhp-stability we have
that every partition resulting from our proposed CF algorithm
is Dhp-stable. Briefly, a Dhp-stable can be thought of as a
state of equilibrium where no coalitions have an incentive to
pursue coalition formation through merge or split.
With regards to Dc stability, a Dc-stable partition has the
following properties [28]: (i)- In a Dc-stable partition T , no
players are interested in leaving T to form other collections
in N (through any operation), (ii)- If it exists, a Dc-stable
partition is the unique outcome of any arbitrary iteration of
merge-and-split and is a Dhp-stable partition, and, (iii)- A Dc-
stable partition T is a unique ⊲-maximal partition, that is for
all partitions T ′ 6= T of N , T ⊲ T ′. When ⊲ is the Pareto
order, the Dc-stable partition presents a Pareto optimal utility
distribution.
However, the existence of a Dc-stable partition is not always
guaranteed [28]. The Dc-stable partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of
the whole space N exists if a partition of N that verifies the
following two necessary and sufficient conditions exists [28]:
(i)
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and each pair of disjoint
coalitions S1 and S2 such that {S1 ∪ S2} ⊆ Ti, we
have {S1 ∪ S2}⊲ {S1, S2}.
2) For the partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} a coalition G ⊂ N
formed of players belonging to different Ti ∈ T is T -
incompatible if for no i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have G ⊂ Ti.
Dc-stability requires that for all T -incompatible coali-
tions {G}[T ] ⊲ {G} where {G}[T ] = {G ∩ Ti ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , l}} is the projection of coalition G on T .
If no partition satisfies these conditions, then no Dc-stable
partitions of N exist. Nevertheless, we have
Lemma 1: For the proposed (N , V ) CSS coalitional game,
the proposed CF algorithm converges to the optimal Dc-stable
partition, if such a partition exists. Otherwise, the final network
partition is Dhp-stable.
Proof: The proof is immediate due to the fact that, when
it exists, the Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome of any
merge-and-split iteration [28] such as any partition resulting
from our CF algorithm.
For the proposed game, the existence of the Dc-stable
partition cannot always be guaranteed although the algorithm
would always converge to this partition when it exists. Given
a partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of SUs, verifying condition (i)
for Dc-stability implies that, for any coalition Ti ∈ T , the
Pareto order as per (9) must be verified for the union of
every pair of sub-coalitions of Ti which, in the context of
collaborative sensing, maps directly into a condition dependent
on the distances between the SUs inside Ti and their non-
cooperative probabilities of miss and false alarm (due to the
utility in (6)). For example, if Ti is a coalition of size 2,
condition (i) implies that Theorem 1 and (10) must be verified
between the two SUs of Ti. Further, if Ti is a coalition of size
3, condition (i) implies the following: (a)
1) The distance between every pair of SUs in Ti must
satisfy (10) and Theorem 1.
2) The distances and probabilities of miss and of false
alarm of the SUs in Ti must satisfy the merge rule using
the Pareto order in (9) (in any direction).
Consequently, simple examples of partitions satisfying con-
dition (i) of Dc-stability would be a partition composed solely
of coalitions of size 2 which verifies (10) and Theorem 1, a
partition T composed of coalitions of size 3 that verifies (a)
and (b), or a partition composed of a mixture of coalitions of
size 2 or 3 satisfying the requirements previously stated. Cer-
tainly, for larger coalitions, condition (i) imposes restrictions
on the distances and probabilities of miss and false alarm of
the cooperating SUs analogous to (10), (a), and (b).
The difficulty of guaranteeing a Dc-stable partition in the
context of collaborative sensing stems from the difficulty of
computing a closed form solution that characterizes condition
(ii). For a partition T , condition (ii) deals with T -incompatible
coalitions, which are coalitions composed of players belonging
to different coalitions Ti ∈ T . In order to clarify this
requirement, consider a 3-player game and a partition T =
{{1, 2}, {3}}. For this case, the T -incompatible coalitions are
G1 = {2, 3}, G2 = {1, 3}, G3 = {1, 2, 3}. For every Gi,
condition (ii) requires that {Gi ∩ {1, 2}, Gi ∩ {3}} ⊲ {G}
which maps into: (A)
1) {{2}, {3}}⊲{2, 3}which implies that SUs 2 and 3 must
not verify (10) as per Theorem 1.
2) {{1}, {3}}⊲{1, 3}which implies that SUs 1 and 3 must
not verify (10) as per Theorem 1.
3) {{1, 2}, {3}}⊲{1, 2, 3}which implies that the Pareto or-
der must not be satisfied, i.e., forming coalition {1, 2, 3}
decreases the payoff of at least one of the SUs.
Consequently, for the 3-player example, verifying condition
(ii) for the existence of a Dc-stable partition depends, mainly,
on the distances between the 3 SUs and their location with
respect to the PU (through the probability of miss) as per
Theorem 1. For larger networks, satisfying condition (ii)
would, once again, depend on the distances between the SUs
of T -incompatible coalitions, however, the number of such
coalitions becomes large, and, thus, mapping the requirement
into closed form conditions such as in Theorem 1 would
be difficult. Note that, for the 3-player example previously
mentioned, in the event where (A)-(C) are satisfied, and, if
{1, 2} satisfies (10), then, partition T = {{1, 2}, {3}} would
verify conditions (i) and (ii), and, thus, it will be a Dc-stable
partition and a unique outcome of the proposed algorithm.
In summary, for verifying condition (i) for existence of the
Dc-stable partition, the SUs belonging to partitions of each
formed coalition must verify the Pareto order as per (9) using
their utility defined in (6). Similarly, for verifying condition (ii)
of Dc stability, SUs belonging to all T -incompatible coalitions
in the network must verify the Pareto order. As shown in the
previous examples, as well as through Theorem 1 (for 2 SUs),
this existence is closely tied to the location of the SUs and the
PU (due to the dependence on the individual miss and false
alarm probabilities in the utility expression (6)) which both
can be random parameters in practical and large networks.
Nonetheless, the proposed algorithm will always guarantee
convergence to this optimal Dc-stable partition when it exists
as stated in Lemma 1. Whenever a Dc-stable partition does
not exist, the coalition structure resulting from the proposed
algorithm will be Dhp-stable as no coalition or SU is able to
10
merge or split any further (can be viewed as a kind of partition
equilibrium).
V. DISTRIBUTED COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
WITH PROBABILITY OF DETECTION GUARANTEES
(CF-PD)
The previously proposed CF algorithm in Section IV allows
the SUs in a cognitive network to minimize their probability of
miss under false alarm constraints. In such a scenario, one can
see the PU rewarding the SUs as much as they improve their
detection and reduce their interference level, hence, providing
an incentive for the SUs to lower their probability of miss as
much as possible. However, in some cognitive networks, in
addition to the false alarm constraint that the SUs require, the
PU (or PU operator) imposes a desired detection probability
χ that the SUs must meet (i.e., a desired interference level)
[3]. The PU introduces such constraints in order to control
the amount of interference that is allowed by SUs or to limit
and control the number of SUs that are allowed to use the
spectrum. The presence of such an additional constraint can
affect the behavior of the SUs, their incentives, and their
collaboration strategies. Hence, the coalition formation process
must be adequately modified in order to cope with the presence
of such an additional detection probability constraint as the
objective of the SUs is no longer to minimize their probability
of miss, but rather to achieve the desired probability of miss
γ = 1 − χ (while meeting the false alarm constraint). In
this context, during a merge or split process, once a coalition
achieves the probability of miss γ, it will have no further
incentive to pursue the coalition formation process. In fact,
in the presence of detection probability constraints, once a
coalition achieves γ increasing the size of the coalition incurs
an increased false alarm (within the constraint α), as well as
extra signalling and sensing time with no extra benefit for the
coalition members.
In order to appropriately capture these new objectives in the
coalition formation process, we introduce, adjunctly with the
proposed (N , V ) coalitional game, a simple voting game [33]
which is defined as a coalitional game with utility function
u : 2N → {0, 1}. By introducing this simple voting game in
the coalition formation process, the new objectives of the SUs,
i.e., probability of detection guarantees, can be accommodated
as will be seen later in this section. For this purpose, we define
the adjunct utility function u as follows:
u(S) =
{
1, if Qd,S ≥ χ and Qf,S ≤ α,
0, otherwise.
(13)
This definition captures the two objectives of the SUs: (i)
Satisfying the probability of detection χ, and, (ii) Maintaining
a false alarm level below α, i.e., keeping Qf,S ≤ α. Thus,
in (13), u(S) = 1 if the probability of detection satisfies χ
and the false alarm constraint is not violated. For a coalition
S where Qf,S > α, as per (6), the utility goes towards
negative infinity, and, thus a coalition with Qf,S > α can
never form, hence, in this case u(S) = 0. During coalition
formation, as will be seen later in this section, the SUs can
utilize both utilities V and u in (7) and (13) in order to make
their cooperative decisions given the objective of achieving the
target probability of detection while making sure that doing so
benefits them as per (7) while the false alarm constraint is not
violated. Further, within the proposed adjunct simple voting
game framework, we make the following definition:
Definition 7: In the proposed CSS game, a coalition S is
said to be winning if u(S) = 1 and losing otherwise. Similarly,
a player is winning if it is part of a winning coalition and
losing otherwise.
Consequently, under a desired probability of detection con-
straint, the objective is to maximize the number of winning
players while minimizing the cost in terms of false alarm
(given the false alarm constraint α) as well as the signaling
overhead within each formed coalitions. In this regard, the
partition stability concepts introduced in Section IV-B are no
longer adequate to assess the performance of the system since
the SUs are no longer looking to maximize their utilities but
rather to form winning coalitions. Therefore, a more adequate
notion for stability is needed through the following concept.
Definition 8: In a simple voting game (N , u), a coalition
S is said to be minimal winning if the defection of any player
in S renders that coalition losing. In other words, a minimal
winning coalition (MWC) S is a coalition such that u(S) =
1 & u(T ) = 0, ∀ T ⊂ S.
From this definition, it follows that, in order to achieve the
detection probability χ with minimum overhead, the SUs have
an incentive to form MWCs. Using Definition 8 and (13), one
can see that, whenever a group of SUs form an MWC, they
have no incentive to leave this MWC. In fact, when an SU
leaves an MWC, as per Definition 8, this SU becomes losing,
i.e., its adjunct utility u becomes 0. Thus, an MWC is highly
suitable to characterize the coalitional structure that forms
when both false alarm and detection probability constraints
are required. Moreover, once the SUs form an MWC, they
have no further incentive to decrease their probability of miss
(which can incur extra false alarm) as they already comply
with the requirements set by the PU.
Jointly with the merge and split operations, we define a new
operation on the coalitions as follows:
Definition 9: Adjust Rule - For any coalition S ⊆ N , the
adjust rule is defined as follows:
CS = Adjust(S) =
{
S, if u(S) = 0,
{SMWC, i1, . . . , ik}, if u(S) = 1,
(14)
where SMWC is the MWC generated out of a winning coalition
S by simply excluding all players i ∈ S such that u(S) =
u(S \ {i}) = 1 and {i1, . . . , ik} is the collection of individual
SUs ij that were excluded from S by the adjust operation.
The exclusion of the players from a winning coalition in order
to yield an MWC can be done in any order. For the proposed
CSS game, we adopt the following convention without any
loss of generality:
Convention 2: The adjust operation generates an MWC
from a winning coalition S by excluding the players i ∈ S
such that u(S) = u(S\{i}) = 1 (note that u(∅) = 0 by defini-
tion of any characteristic function), in a sequential manner by
an increasing order of their non-cooperative probability of miss
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Pm,i. In other words, the SUs verifying u(S) = u(S\{i}) = 1
and having the smallest non-cooperative probability of miss
are excluded first and their collection constitutes {i1, . . . , ik}.
The motivation behind this convention is that, once and if ex-
cluded, SUs with a small non-cooperative probability of miss
have higher chances (than SUs with larger miss probabilities)
to find other partners with whom to form an MWC.
Having defined the necessary new concepts, the coalition
formation Phase 2 of the proposed CF algorithm in Table I
can be easily modified by introducing the adjust operation. In
this regard, Phase 2 of the algorithm in Table I is split into
two phases: Phase 2a and Phase 2b. In Phase 2a, an adjust
operation is applied to every coalition in the network partition
prior to merge-and-split, which results in a partition T0 that
can be divided into two collections: a collection W0 with
MWCs only and a collection L0 with the remaining coalitions.
In Phase 2b, adaptive coalition formation through merge-and-
split is applied only to partition L0. Nonetheless, in Phase 2b
of the algorithm, the adjust operation needs to be further
incorporated within merge-and-split. For instance, whenever a
coalition forms by merge (or by split), it is subject to an adjust
operation. In the event where a formed coalition is winning
and the adjust operation results in an MWC, this MWC no
longer participates in any future merge or split. However, any
SUs excluded from the coalition through the adjust operation,
continue to participate in merge-and-split. Consequently, the
adaptive coalition formation process terminates by resulting
in two collections: A collection Wf having only MWCs
and another collection Lf with losing coalitions that can no
longer be subject to any merge, split or adjust operations. The
final network partition is simply F = W0 ∪ Wf ∪ Lf . The
convergence of the CF-PD algorithm to this final network is
guaranteed since the presence of the adjust operation (which is
an operation internal to each coalition) in Phase 2b does not
affect the convergence of the merge-and-split iterations that
was assessed in Section IV since this convergence is indepen-
dent of the starting partition. This algorithm is referred to as
the distributed coalition formation algorithm with probability
of detection guarantees (CF-PD) algorithm and is summarized
in Table II. Note that, in the final network, the SUs that belong
to the collection of losing coalitions Lf have improved their
sensing performance compared to their non-cooperative state,
however, they would need to wait environmental changes, such
as mobility or the arrival of new SUs, in order to become
winning SUs/coalitions, i.e., meet the required probability of
detection constraint χ through cooperation.
VI. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION OF CF AND CF-PD
In this section, we discuss and present some of the chal-
lenges for the implementation of the proposed CF and CF-PD
algorithms in practical cognitive networks.
A. Neighbor Discovery
In the first phase of the CF and CF-PD algorithms, for
discovering their neighbors, each coalition (or single SU)
needs to utilize a neighbor discovery techniques in order to dis-
cover potential cooperation partners for performing the local
TABLE II
ONE ROUND OF THE PROPOSED CF-PD ALGORITHM.
Initial State
The network is partitioned by T = {T1, . . . , Tk} (At the beginning
of all time T = N = {1, . . . , N} with non-cooperative SUs).
Three phases in each round of the CF-PD algorithm
Phase 1 - Discovery:
This phase remains the same as in the CF algorithm of Table I.
Phase 2a - Partition Adjustment:
Adjust the initial partition T = {T1, . . . , Tk}
a) CTi = Adjust(Ti), ∀ Ti ∈ T
b) T0 = ∪ki=1CTi can be divided into 2 collections
b1) L0 = {L1, . . . , Lp}, Li ∈ T0, u(Li) = 0
b2) W0 = {W1, . . . ,Wq}, Wi ∈ T0, u(Wi) = 1
Phase 2b - Adaptive Coalition Formation with Probability of
Detection Guarantees:
initialize Lf = L0
repeat
a) {Wf ,Lf} = MergeAndAdjust(Lf ); merge algorithm
with adjust as explained in Section V.
b) {Wf ,Lf} = SplitAndAdjust(Lf ); split algorithm with
adjust as explained in Section V.
until merge-and-split with adjust terminates.
Final partition is F =W0 ∪Wf ∪ Lf
Phase 3 - Coalition Sensing:
This phase remains the same as in the CF algorithm of Table I.
Similar to the CF algorithm, Phase 2 (a and b) of CF-PD is
repeated periodically to allow the SUs to adapt the network
structure to environmental changes such as mobility.
merge. In other words, each coalition in the network surveys
neighboring coalitions within merge range and attempts to
merge according to the Pareto order. For performing merge, the
SUs are required to know their own probabilities of miss and
their distance to the neighbors in order to assess the potential
utility that they can acquire by collaboration which is given by
(6). Note that, although, in order to assess (6), the SUs need
to also learn the probability of miss of their neighbors, i.e., the
distance between the neighbors and the SU, this information
can be sent by the neighbors over a control channel during
the negotiation phase of the merge process. Hence, the SUs
do not necessarily need to estimate this value by themselves.
In Rayleigh fading, the non-cooperative probability of miss
is mainly a function of the average SNR to the PU, and, hence,
the distance to the PU as seen in (1). Consequently, for per-
forming coalition formation, the main information that needs
to be gathered by the SUs consists of the distances between
these neighbors as well as the distance between the PU and
the SU. For finding this information, numerous methods are
available for the SUs in practical cognitive networks:
1) Information received through control channels in cogni-
tive networks such as the recently proposed Cognitive
Pilot Channel (CPC) [34]–[38].
2) Signal-processing based methods [3], [15], [32], [39],
[40].
3) Existing ad hoc routing neighbor discovery techniques
applied in cognitive network [29]–[32].
4) Geo-location techniques [2], [41]–[44].
1) Neighbor discovery through control channels: In order
to maintain a conflict-free environment between the SUs and
PUs of a cognitive network, there has been a recent interest
in providing, through control channels, assistance to the SUs
12
on both the spectrum sensing and access levels by providing
useful information that the SUs can use to improve their
performance. For example, in [34], a control channel, called
the Common Spectrum Coordination Channel (CSCC) has
been proposed for the announcement of radio and service
parameters to allow a coordinated coexistence between SUs
and PUs. Following a similar concept, the Cognitive Pilot
Channel (CPC) has been recently proposed [35]–[38] as a
means for providing frequency and geographical information
to cognitive users, assisting them in sensing and accessing the
spectrum. Notably, the CPC can assist the SUs to discover
neighboring PUs and SUs in the presence of multiple access
technologies and heterogeneous environments. Thus, as ex-
plained in [35]–[37], the CPC is a control channel that carries
information such as available spectrum opportunities, existing
PUs or geographical information on neighboring SUs. A CPC
channel can be deployed in a cognitive network by either a
broadcast manner, i.e., a station that broadcasts the CPC to all
of its users, or an on-demand manner, i.e., the CPC information
is sent to the SUs upon request. In this paper, the CPC can be
delivered to the SUs by the receivers or a stand alone spectrum
broker which is able to obtain information on the existing SUs,
PUs, or other needed CPC details. Following the formation of
a coalition, an SU can also signal to its receiver or to the
broker its membership in a coalition, which is an information
that can be further appended to the CPC.
Consequently, by listening to the CPC transmission the
SUs can discover their own probabilities of miss (i.e., their
distances to the PU), the presence of neighboring SUs, the
distance to other SUs, and, possibly the coalition memberships
of these SUs. Since various efficient implementations of the
CPC or other information control channels for cognitive net-
works are ubiquitous, then, using these channels, the SUs can
acquire the needed information for forming coalitions through
CF or CF-PD with a reasonable overhead.
2) Signal processing-based methods: In Rayleigh fading,
discovering neighboring nodes and finding an estimate of
the distances to these nodes can be achieved through signal
processing techniques [40] by computing the average received
power, from the neighboring SUs and from the PU. To do so,
in the proposed model, prior to any coalition formation, i.e., in
Phase 1 of the algorithm, each SU can attempt to compute the
average received power, while listening to a control channel
for example. Another approach would be for the SUs to
estimate this average received power during the operation of
the network prior to coalition formation. In other words, in a
given initial partition T0, the SUs start by performing spectrum
sensing and, then, use the results in order to access the channel.
During spectrum access, the SUs can monitor the transmission
received from other SUs, and, then, discover existing SUs
in the network as well as the distance to these SUs through
an estimation, using signal processing-based methods, of the
average received SNR from these SUs. This information on
the neighbors and the distances to them will be useful for the
SUs to take adequate coalition formation decisions in Phase 2
of the algorithm. It must be stressed that the use of received
power estimates for neighbor discovery is quite common as
shown in [3], [15], [32], [39], [40].
The measured mean received power from the PU (whose
transmission is always monitored by the SUs for cognitive
radio access), can be used by every SU to find its individual
probability of miss. For instance, in this paper, we deal mainly
with the probability of miss averaged over the small-scale
Rayleigh fading as given in (1), and which is common in
many cognitive radio literature, e.g. [7]–[10], [12]–[15] and
the references therein. By closely inspecting (1), one would
see that, for a given time-bandwidth product m and detection
threshold λ, the probability of miss of an SU mainly depends
on the average received SNR from the PU signal, which, is
a function of the path loss, and, thus, the distance between
the SU and PU. Typically, an SU needs only to average the
received power from the PU over several samples to compute
this average (with respect to fading) SNR. Therefore, an SU
can use the measured mean received power from the PU to
estimate its distance to the PU (or the average SNR), and,
subsequently, its individual probability of miss. For a coalition
of SUs, each member can find its own individual probability
of miss and, consequently, since the SUs of a coalition are
aware of the location of each other, they can work out the
potential probability of miss of their coalition as per (3).
Finally, note that, using signal-processing techniques to dis-
cover neighboring SUs, a coalition of SUs Ti ∈ T needs only
to discover SUs in a small geographical area around it (since
otherwise no potential merge is possible as demonstrated for
example in Theorem 1 for the 2-SU case) and does not need to
know which coalitions each SU belongs to. The information
on the membership of the SUs into a coalition can be found
out in subsequent pairwise interactions over a control channel
between the coalition Ti and its discovered neighboring SUs
(since each SU knows which coalition it belongs to).
3) Existing ad hoc routing discovery techniques applied
in cognitive networks: In the past decade, techniques for
neighbor discovery have been widely spread in the context
of ad hoc routing [29] whereby numerous methods for finding
neighboring nodes and information on these nodes are devel-
oped. Recently, these approaches have been leveraged in order
to provide neighbor discovery in cognitive radio networks
[30]–[32].
While an in-depth study of these neighbor discovery tech-
niques is beyond the scope of this paper, we will provide
a simple example of such techniques which can assist the
SUs for the purpose of coalition formation. For instance, one
popular idea for neighbor discovery is the use of methods
based on the well known on demand distance vector (AODV)
protocol of ad hoc routing [32]. In this protocol, each node
periodically broadcasts a “Hello” packet, in order to detect its
neighbors. In a cognitive network, several methods based on
this idea can be used by the SUs to discover the PUs or other
SUs. As shown in [32], to do so, each SU can establish an
ad hoc temporary control information channel, over which it
broadcasts its “Hello” packet which contains the SU’s mobile
IP address, location information, frequencies of all ad hoc
temporary control channels, exact time when SU will tune to
ad hoc channels to listen for reception, transmission schedules
of “Hello” messages, time stamp according to its internal
clock, coalition membership, or other information. Several
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techniques for transmitting the “Hello” packets are given in
[32]. Upon receiving the “Hello” message, an SU can adjust its
own transmission power according to the distance calculated
from the information contained within the broadcasted “Hello”
message, and then broadcast a “Hello Ack” message with its
own information. Using this “Hello” and “Hello ACK” proce-
dure, the SUs can discover each other [32] and, subsequently,
engage in a coalition formation process.
Beyond this idea, numerous other techniques for cognitive
radio neighbor discovery, using similar concepts from ad hoc
routing discovery, can be found in [30], [31] (and references
therein) along with their details. By adopting any of these
techniques, the neighbor discovery phase of the proposed
coalition formation algorithm can be implemented, allowing
the SUs to gather any needed information for the merge-and-
split phase.
4) Geo-location techniques: In some cognitive networks,
in order to improve the coexistence between the secondary
and primary networks, the SUs are required to register and
connect, through the Internet, to incumbent databases [41]–
[44]. The principal purpose of this requirement is to provide
a mechanism to inform SUs about their neighboring SUs or
PUs [41]. These databases can hold information on the PUs,
the SUs, their positions, their capabilities, and so on. For the
purpose of coalition formation, the databases may also hold
a field that displays the coalition membership of the SUs, if
any.
The information in these databases is entered either au-
tomatically by every SU or PU that enters the network, or
by a centralized administrator that controls these databases
[41]. In this context, the need for knowing the position of the
nodes (SU or PU) prior to filling the database is required.
For fixed SUs or PUs, obtaining this information for filling
the databases is straightforward. However, when the SUs or
PUs are mobile devices, two cases can be distinguished. In
an outdoor environment, the SUs or PUs can use techniques
based on the global positioning service (GPS) in order to
obtain their own locations and update the databases. If no
GPS is available or the nodes are indoor, finding the position
becomes more challenging. In this case, the nodes can use
advanced positioning techniques such as reference anchors
[41], the signal processing techniques of Subsection VI-A2,
or other techniques [42]–[44].
Although the technical details on building the databases
is beyond the scope of this paper (the interested reader is
referred to [41]–[44] and the references therein), nonetheless,
for coalition formation, the SUs can access the databases in
order to discover the position of the PU or their neighboring
SUs, or even, the coalition memberships of the neighbors. By
doing so, the SUs would obtain all the necessary information
for the coalition formation phase of CF or CF-PD.
In summary, neighbor discovery techniques for cognitive
radio networks are abundant. For the proposed coalition for-
mation algorithm, any of these techniques can be adopted
in Phase 1 as they all allow the SUs to obtain estimates
of the needed information for the coalition formation phase.
Certainly, there is a tradeoff between accuracy and complexity
for each of these techniques, however, for coalition formation,
one can adopt any technique with a reasonable tradeoff (e.g.,
the CPC or the signal processing techniques) as long as it can
convey enough information on the neighboring SUs and the
PU in the network.
Hence, once these parameters are estimated using either the
received power estimation, or geo-location techniques, or the
CPC, the coalitions (or individual SUs) can then decide on
the partners, if any, with whom they can cooperate (merge)
for spectrum sensing. Moreover, with regards to the split
operation, each formed coalition can internally make the
decision to split or not depending on whether its members
can find a split form that is preferred by the Pareto order.
B. Coalition Formation Operations: Merge, Split, and Adjust
The complexity of the coalition formation phase of the
proposed CF algorithm lies mainly in the complexity of the
merge and split operations. It is important to stress that the
complexity of the algorithm is independent of whether a Dc-
stable partition exists or not. For instance, as per Lemma 1
and as shown in [28], any implementation of a merge-and-split
algorithm would reach the Dc-stable partition (if it exists) at
no extra complexity). Hence, reaching an optimal and stable
partition (when such a partition exists) does not incur extra
complexity. For a given network structure, during one merge
process, each coalition attempts to merge with other coalitions
in its vicinity in a pairwise manner. In the worst case scenario,
every SU, before finding a suitable merge partner, needs to
make a merge attempt with all the other SUs in N . In this
case, the first SU requires N −1 attempts for merge (N being
the number of SUs), the second requires N − 2 attempts and
so on. The total worst case number of merge attempts will be∑N−1
i=1 i =
N(N−1)
2 . In practice, the merge process requires a
significantly lower number of attempts since finding a suitable
partner does not always require to go through all the merge
attempts (once a suitable partner is identified the merge will
occur immediately). This complexity is further reduced by
the fact that a coalition does not need to attempt to merge
with far away or large coalitions where the false alarm cost is
large relatively to the benefit or where the false alarm is larger
than α (Theorem 1 being an example of such merge regions
for the two SUs case). Moreover, after the first run of the
algorithm, the initial N non-cooperative SUs will self-organize
into larger coalitions. Subsequent runs of the algorithms will
deal with a network composed of a number of coalitions that
is much smaller than N ; reducing the merge attempts per
coalition. Finally, once a group of coalitions merges into a
larger coalition, the number of merging possibilities for the
remaining SUs will decrease as the merge region becomes
smaller (due to cooperation costs).
For the split rule, in a worst case scenario, splitting can
involve finding all the possible partitions of the set formed by
the SUs in a single coalition. For a given coalition, this number
is given by the Bell number which grows exponentially with
the number of SUs in the coalition (here the partition search
is restricted to each coalition and is not over the whole set
N ) [23]. In practice, this split operation is restricted to the
formed coalitions in the network, and, thus, it will be applied
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on small sets. Due to the cost function in (6) and (8) , the
size of each coalition resulting from CSS coalition formation
is limited by the increasing false alarm cost as well as by the
SUs’ locations, thus, the coalitions formed in the proposed
CSS game are small. As a result, the split complexity is
limited to finding possible partitions for small sets which can
be reasonable in terms of complexity. The split complexity is
further reduced by the fact that, in most scenarios, a coalition
does not need to search for all possible split forms. For
instance, once a coalition identifies a split structure verifying
the Pareto order, the SUs in this coalition will split, and the
search for further split forms is not needed. In summary, the
practical aspects dictated by the cognitive network such as
the increasing false alarm cost, the errors on the reporting
channel, the SUs’ locations and the sequential split search
will significantly diminish the split complexity. In addition, the
complexity of both merge and split is also reduced due to the
fact that the algorithm is distributed, and hence all decisions
are local to the coalitions.
In CF-PD, the adjust operation can be decided by each
coalition internally similar to the merge or split operations
as explained in Section VI. Further, for the CF-PD algorithm,
typically the merge and split operation will be less complex
than for the CF algorithm in Table I since winning coalitions
do not participate in the merge and split process. However,
for CF-PD, another operation comes into place, which is the
adjust operation. The adjust operation is local to each winning
coalition S in the network (adjust has no effect on losing
coalitions) and its complexity grows linearly in |S| (number of
SUs in S). Generally, the coalitions that form in the network
are small, thus, the adjust rule complexity is very small.
C. Coalition Based Sensing
Once the coalitions form, the operation of the network
within every coalition (Phase 3 in the CF and CF-PD al-
gorithms) is, as briefly prescribed in Sections II and IV-A,
systematic. First and foremost, within every coalition each SU
prepares a single sensing bit based on its local observation,
and then delivers this bit to the coalition head through the
wireless channel. Subsequently, the coalition head can perform
the fusion of the bits and broadcast back the result, in a single
bit, to all the coalition members. In this paper, we adopt the
common OR-rule for decision fusion (hard decisions) that is
widely used in collaborative sensing in cognitive radio [7],
[9], [10], [12]–[15]4. The operation of the network in this
phase, i.e., Phase 3, can be used in order to compare the
communication overhead for collaborative sensing between
our proposed approach with that of the traditional network-
wide fusion center solution such as [7], [9], [10], [12]–[15].
The reason is that, the actual collaborative sensing which takes
place in Phase 3 while the coalition formation phase occurs
only periodically (seldom in moderately changing environ-
ments). For example, in a static network, coalition formation is
performed only once, and subsequently, the SUs can perform
collaborative sensing at the level of their coalitions. In this
4Note that, the proposed coalition formation algorithm can be tailored to
accommodate other decision fusion techniques.
regards, in the network-wide fusion center, every single SU in
the network needs to report its sensing bit to the fusion center,
which yields up to N bits report where N is the total number
of SUs. When the network is large and the SUs are spread out
far way from the fusion center, this communication overhead
is quite significant. In contrast, in Phase 3 of the proposed
algorithm, in order to perform coalition-based collaborative
sensing, the SUs belonging to the same coalition, would need
to only do a local exchange of the sensing bits, at the level
of a coalition, which would have a size much smaller than N .
For instance, as demonstrated in Theorem 2, due to the false
alarm constraint, the size of the coalitions resulting from the
proposed algorithm is upper bounded. In fact, as will be seen
through simulations in Section VII, the size of the resulting
coalitions will, in general, be much smaller than N . Thus,
clearly, the bandwidth required for the communications of
the sensing bits in Phase 3 of our algorithm is quite low, as
only single bits are exchanged between coalition members.
In fact, within each coalition, the overhead communication
required for performing collaborative sensing will be much
smaller than N . Beyond the overhead communication advan-
tage, performing collaborative sensing at the level of coalitions
would save power and energy for the SUs since, in general,
they would report their bits to a neighboring coalition head.
Moreover, the proposed approach would make reporting the
sensing bits more reliable since, in each individual formed
coalition, the probability of error over the reporting channel
as per (5) would be much smaller than in the case where
all N SUs need to submit their bits to a fusion center. In
a nutshell, performing collaborative sensing at the level of
coalitions not only reduces the overhead communication but,
also, improves reliability and reduces the power consumption
(used for sensing) of the SUs. For multiple access within each
coalition (during sensing bit exchange), well known existing
MAC protocols can be readily used, such as simple orthogonal
channels [7], [9], [10], [12]–[15], random access techniques
[41], or low temperature handshake solutions such as in [45].
For adapting to environmental changes such as mobility, the
SUs perform the first two phases of the proposed CF algorithm
in Table I periodically over time (see Subsection IV-A).
D. Impact of Potential Estimation Errors
In this paper, as mentioned in Section II, all the SUs are
considered as honest nodes that do not exhibit any malicious or
cheating behavior. Hence, only estimation errors (e.g., due to a
low received SNR from the PU) may have some impact on the
formed coalitions, if, once a coalition forms, the probability
of miss of an SU is not as good as envisioned during the
coalition formation process. Here, all the cooperation decisions
are based on the probability of miss that is averaged over the
fading realizations, as per (1). In this context, the probability
of miss in (1) already captures the possibility of having a
low SNR received from the PU, which, in turn, maps into
an estimation error. Therefore, the SUs that are more apt
to making estimation errors, i.e., SUs far away from the
PU, would exhibit a high non-cooperative probability of miss
as per (1). In consequence, whenever such SUs report their
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probabilities of miss to potential merge candidates, these
candidates would be aware of the high probability of miss
and would use it in order to find out whether the cooperative
performance, i.e., as per (3), would satisfy the Pareto order or
not. Hence, the estimation errors due to low SNR, as obtained
by (1), are handled adequately through the Pareto order merge
or split decisions that are based on the utility function in (6).
Therefore, these errors do not perturb the convergence of the
merge-and-split algorithm.
Nonetheless, following the convergence of merge-and-split,
consider a group of SUs that have merged together into
a coalition S. This coalition, in Phase 3 of the algorithm,
would start acting cooperatively and performing distributed
collaborative sensing. During this phase, the SUs in S can
monitor their overall performance as opposed to the expected
performance when the merge agreement has occurred. In
this case, if it turns out that, when the SUs in S operate
cooperatively, the actual probability of miss achieved by one of
the SUs in S is, due to estimation errors, much higher than the
value potentially envisioned during coalition formation (e.g.,
this can be estimated through the number of collisions that
the SUs in this coalition had with the PU when they start
accessing the spectrum), then this SU can be excluded by the
coalition. The procedure for excluding these SUs is out of the
scope of the present paper; however, one can use approaches
similar to the ones used for identifying malicious SUs (e.g.,
onion peeling) such as in [46], [47].
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, the following network is set up: The PU
is placed at the center of a 3 km ×3 km square area with
the SUs randomly deployed in the area around the PU. We
set the PU transmit power PPU = 100 mW, the SU transmit
power for reporting the sensing bits Pi = 10 mW, ∀i ∈ N
and the noise σ2 = −90 dBm. For path loss, we set µ = 3
and κ = 1. The maximum false alarm constraint is set to
α = 0.1, as recommended by the IEEE 802.22 standard [48].
In practical cognitive networks, it is desirable to reduce the
access delays and the bandwidth needed for sensing [3], [8],
hence, the the time bandwidth product m is generally chosen
to be small [3], [7]–[9], [12], [13]. In the simulations, unless
stated otherwise, we select m = 5 which is a common value
used widely in all literature [7]–[9], [12], [13]. In this section,
all statistical results (when applicable) are averaged over 5000
random locations of the SUs as well as a range of energy
detection thresholds λ that do not violate the false alarm
constraint; this in turn, maps into an average over the non-
cooperative false alarm range Pf ≤ α (obviously, for Pf > α
no cooperation is possible).
In Fig. 2, we show a snapshot of the network structure
resulting from the proposed CF (dashed line) and CF-PD
(solid line) algorithms for N = 16 randomly placed SUs,
a non-cooperative false alarm Pf = 0.01, and a target
detection probability χ = 95% for CF-PD. We note that, while
the CF-PD yields 10 coalitions which comprise 5 SUs that
decided to remain non-cooperative, the CF algorithm yields
only 5 coalitions with no SUs remaining non-cooperative.
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Fig. 2. A snapshot of the coalitional structure resulting from both CF (in
dashed line) and CF-PD (solid line) algorithms for N = 16 SUs, Pf = 0.01,
and a target detection probability χ = 95% for CF-PD.
Due to their proximity to the PU, the non-cooperative detec-
tion probabilities of SUs 2, 3, 7, 10, and 16 are, respectively,
98.8%, 99.8%, 96.6%, 99.1%, and 97.2%, which satisfy the
required target threshold χ = 95% for these SUs. Thus, in
CF-PD, SUs 2, 3, 7, 10 and 16 form a singleton MWC each
and have no incentive to cooperate as they already satisfy the
desired performance non-cooperatively. Moreover, coalitions
{1, 4}, {8, 12}, and {6, 15} are MWCs, and, thus, do not
cooperate any further during CF-PD. In contrast, when the
CF algorithm is applied, the SUs seek to minimize their
probability of miss and, thus, SUs 2 and 3 form a coalition
with SU 9, SUs 10 and 16 form a coalition with SU 5,
while SU 7 minimizes its probability of miss by merging
with coalition {1, 4}. Further, for CF, SUs 6, 8, 12, and 15
minimize their probability of miss by forming a single coali-
tion {6, 8, 12, 15}. Finally, we note that for both CF and
CF-PD coalition {11, 13, 14} forms, and this coalition is a
losing coalition since the achieved probability of detection
by its member SUs is only 89.5% (due to the location of
its members). Moreover, this coalition is unable to find any
suitable partners that can help it improve its utility further
in CF, or meet the target detection threshold in CF-PD. In
a nutshell, Fig. 2 illustrates how, in a practical cognitive
network, different coalitions can emerge depending on the
incentives and cooperative objectives of the SUs.
Figs. 3 and 4 show, respectively, the average probabilities of
miss and the average false alarm probabilities achieved per SU
for different network sizes and for a typical time-bandwidth
product of m = 5 and a large time-bandwidth product of
m = 1000. In Fig. 3, we show that, for m = 5, the proposed
CF algorithm yields a significant advantage in the average
probability of miss reaching up to 88.45% reduction (at N =
50) relative to the non-cooperative case which is an order of
magnitude of improvement. This advantage is increasing with
the network size N . In this figure, we also show the results of
a centralized exhaustive search solution which minimizes the
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Fig. 3. Average probability of miss versus number of SUs N for m = 5
and m = 1000.
average probability of miss per SU, subject to the false alarm
constraint α. This solution is shown for up to N = 7 since it
is mathematically intractable for larger networks.
We note that, for all m, a gap exists between the perfor-
mance of the CF algorithm and that of the centralized solution.
This gap stems mainly from the individual choices of the
SUs when they act in a distributed manner, i.e., selecting
their partners based on a balance between gains and costs as
opposed to a centralized approach that does not capture these
individual incentives. For CF, these incentives are captured by
the cost function in (8) which increases drastically when the
false alarm probability is in the vicinity of α. This increased
cost makes it generally non-beneficial for coalitions with high
false alarm levels, e.g., false alarm values close to α, to
collaborate in the distributed CF approach as they require a
large probability of miss improvement to compensate the cost
in their utility (6). As a result, even though the CF algorithm
yields a performance gap in terms of miss probability for all
m, the individual decisions of the SUs force a false alarm
for the distributed case smaller than that of the centralized
solution as seen in Fig. 4 at all m. In other words, when
an SU (or coalition) is taking its own decision, it needs to
obtain a gain, in terms of probability of miss, that is relatively
larger than the increase in the false alarm (relative to the
constraint α) as captured by the utility and cost function in
(6). In contrast, in the centralized approach, the optimization
problem stated in Section II does not involve the individual
utilities or decisions of the SUs, instead it optimizes the overall
average probability of miss given a constraint on the overall
false alarm probability. Consequently, the centralized approach
would definitely yield a smaller average probability of miss,
but it also yields a false alarm level that is much closer
to the constraint α, i.e., a false alarm level that is higher
than in the distributed approach. This result is corroborated
in Fig. 4 where, at all m, the achieved average false alarm
by the proposed distributed solution outperforms that of the
centralized solution, however, it is still outperformed by the
non-cooperative case.
In addition, even though a small m is typical in cognitive
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Fig. 4. Average false alarm probability versus number of SUs N for m = 5.
networks [7]–[9], [12], [13], a large time-bandwidth product
may be used in some instances when detection at low SNR is
required. By increasing the observation time (or the bandwidth
used for sensing), the SUs can improve their non-cooperative
average probability of miss non-cooperatively as shown in
Fig. 3 for m = 1000. However, this gain comes at the expense
of a long delay for spectrum access or a wasted bandwidth.
At m = 1000, although for the centralized approach a perfor-
mance improvement in terms of probability of miss is possible,
we note that for the proposed distributed CF algorithm no
coalitions are formed and the performance is comparable to
the non-cooperative case. This is mainly due to the fact that,
at m = 1000, the average non-cooperative probability of miss
of all SUs is already quite small (around 2%), and, hence,
when the SUs act in a distributed manner, they find little
improvement in their utility (6) through cooperation, since
the gains in probability of miss will be accompanied with a
large increase in the false alarm as shown in Fig. 4 for the
centralized approach at m = 1000. However, by comparing
the results at m = 5 and m = 1000, Fig. 3 shows that,
by using our proposed CF algorithm, the SUs can improve
their detection significantly without the need for a wasted
bandwidth or long access delays. For example, for a network
of N = 50 SUs at m = 5, the SUs can achieve a probability of
detection which is comparable (and slightly outperforms) the
non-cooperative case at m = 1000. Hence, the comparison
between the CF results at m = 5 and the non-cooperative
results at m = 1000 in Fig. 3 demonstrates that, instead of
increasing the sensing observation time or bandwidth (notably
when detection at low SNR is needed), the SUs can utilize the
proposed CF algorithm to improve their detection performance
while saving bandwidth and reducing their spectrum access
delay.
In Fig. 5, we show the average probabilities of miss per
SU for different thresholds λ (range of non-cooperative false
alarm Pf ≤ α) for N = 7. Fig. 5 shows that, as Pf decreases,
the performance advantage of CSS for both the centralized
and distributed CF solutions increases (except for very small
Pf where the advantage in terms of miss probability reaches
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with m = 5.
its maximum). The performance gap between centralized
and distributed is once again compensated by a false alarm
advantage for the distributed CF solution as already seen and
explained in Fig. 4 for N = 7. Finally, Fig. 5 shows that as
Pf goes to α = 0.1, the CSS advantage diminishes as the
network tends to the non-cooperative case.
In Fig. 6 we investigate, through Theorem 1 (with Pf =
0.01), the merge possibilities between two secondary users
SU1 and SU2, with Pm,1 ≤ Pm,2. The results are shown
for different locations of SU1 when SU2 belongs to circles
centered at the PU and with different radii (each circle radius
represents a class of non-cooperative probability of miss).
Fig. 6 shows the angle, in degrees, of the sector centered
at SU1 and which intercepts the merge region arc at the
various circles where SU2 belongs (obviously a larger angle
intercepts a larger merge region arc). The angle is obtained by
a simple geometrical computation after finding the minimum
distance d˜1,2 between SU1 and SU2 using Theorem 1. First
and foremost, Fig. 6 shows that the approximate solution
obtained by Theorem 1 is almost the same as the exact
numerical (graphical) solution, which corroborates that the ap-
proximation in Theorem 1 for the distances is tight. Moreover,
Fig. 6 clearly shows that, for the different SU1 locations, the
merge region is larger as the radius of SU2’s circle is smaller
(i.e. error on the reporting channel is smaller). Further, we note
that as SU1 becomes closer to the PU, the number of circles
where SU2 can belong and on which a merge region exists
becomes smaller. For instance, when SU1 is at 0.8 km, it can
merge with SU2 moving on circles of radii up to 2.3 km. In
other words, when SU2 belongs to a circle with a radius 1.5 km
larger than the radius of the circle to which SU1 belong, the
coalition cannot form. However, when SU1 is at 0.4 km it
can merge with SU2 belonging to circles with radii up to
1.5 km, hence, only around 1.1 km larger than the radius
of the circle to which SU1 belong. This result shows that,
when SU1 has a smaller probability of miss (i.e. better non-
cooperative performance), the collaboration possibilities with
distant SUs become smaller, since SU1 is already satisfied with
its non-cooperative probability of miss and does not have an
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Fig. 6. Approximate (via Theorem 1) and exact (graphical solution for
inequality) angle centered at SU1 and intercepting the merge region arc (for
forming a coalition of size 2) between SU1 and SU2 (Pm,1 ≤ Pm,2) when
SU2 belongs to circles centered at the PU and having different radii (each
circle radius represents a different non-cooperative probability of miss) and
for different locations of SU1.
incentive to collaborate with very distant SUs. In summary,
Fig. 6 provides interesting insights on how two SUs can merge,
depending on their location with respect to the PU.
Fig. 7 shows how the structure of the cognitive network
with N = 50 SUs evolves and self-adapts, while all the
SUs use a basic random walk mobility model whereby the
nodes move at a constant speed of of 120 km/h in a random
direction uniformly distributed between 0 and 2pi, over periods
of 5 seconds for a total duration of 5 minutes. The proposed
CF algorithm is repeated periodically by the SUs every θ = 5
seconds, in order to provide self-adaptation to mobility. As
the SUs move, the structure of the network changes, with new
coalitions forming and others splitting. The network starts with
a non-cooperative structure made up of 50 independent SUs. In
the first step, the network self-organizes in 18 coalitions with
an average of 2.77 SUs per coalition. As time evolves, the SUs
self-organize the structure which is changing as new coalitions
form or others split. After the 5 minutes have elapsed the final
structure is made up of 20 coalitions with an average of 2.5
SUs per coalition.
In Fig. 8, we evaluate the performance of the CF-PD
algorithm of Table II by showing the average percentage
of winning SUs (average over locations of SUs and non-
cooperative false alarm range Pf ≤ α ), i.e., SUs achieving
a detection probability χ = 95% imposed by the PU (the
choice of χ = 95% conforms with the recommendation
of the IEEE 802.22 standard [48]) as a function of the
network size N . We compare the performance of CF-PD
to that of the non-cooperative case as well as the optimal
partition that maximizes the number of winning SUs and
which is found by a centralized search over all partitions
formed of MWCs. For CF-PD, the percentage of winning
SUs increases with the number of SUs since the possibility
of finding cooperating partners increases. In contrast, the non-
cooperative approach presents an almost constant performance
with different network sizes. Cooperation presents a significant
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Fig. 7. Evolution of the network’s structure over time using CF for a network
of N = 50 SUs, a constant speed of 120 km/h and a non-cooperative false
alarm Pf = 0.01.
advantage over the non-cooperative case in terms of average
percentage of winning SUs, and this advantage increases
with the network size approximately tripling the number of
winning SUs (relative to the non-cooperative case) at N = 50.
Furthermore, compared to the optimal solution, the proposed
CF-PD algorithm achieves a highly comparable performance
with a loss not exceeding 3.7 percentage points at N = 7.
This shows that, by using the proposed CF-PD algorithm, the
network can achieve a performance that is close to optimal.
Note that, for networks larger than N = 7 SUs, finding the
optimal partition through exhaustive search is mathematically
and computationally intractable. However, as the network size
increases CF-PD presents a portion of winning SUs that is
close to 100%, reaching up to 87.25% at N = 50, hence,
as the network grows, the performance gap relatively to the
optimal case will not increase much. Finally, in Fig. 8, we note
that for the proposed algorithm, the non-cooperative case, and
the optimal solution, some SUs (or coalitions) are still losing,
i.e., unable to meet the χ = 95% constraint. This is mainly due
to the current locations and channels of these SUs. In order
for these SUs to meet the desired performance level, they need
to wait for environmental changes, such as their own mobility
(moving to a better location) or the arrival of new SUs that
can boost their performance.
In Fig. 9, we show the average percentage of winning SUs
(average over locations of SUs and non-cooperative false alarm
range Pf ≤ α ) achieved by CF-PD for N = 50 SUs
as the desired probability of miss γ = 1 − χ increases
(i.e. desired detection probability decreases) within the range
recommended by the IEEE 802.22 [48]. As γ increases, the
number of winning SUs increases for both the CF-PD and the
non-cooperative case, as it becomes easier to guarantee this
required probability. Fig. 9 shows that the proposed CF-PD al-
gorithm guarantees that at least 74.1% of the SUs (at γ = 0.01,
the most stringent constraint) achieve the desired detection
probability. Further, at all γ, CF-PD presents a significant
advantage over the non-cooperative case which increases as
the desired detection probability becomes stricter. For instance,
at γ = 0.01 (i.e. χ = 99%), CF-PD allows around eight times
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Fig. 9. Average percentage of winning SUs versus the desired probability
of miss γ = 1− χ for the proposed CF-PD algorithm for N = 50 SUs.
more SUs (relative to the non-cooperative case) to achieve the
required probability of detection. In Fig. 10, for a network
of N = 50 SUs, we evaluate the sizes of the coalitions
resulting from CF and CF-PD (with χ = 95%) and compare
them with the the upper bound Mmax derived in Theorem 2.
First, as the non-cooperative Pf increases, for CF and CF-
PD, both the maximum and the average size of the formed
coalitions decrease converging towards the non-cooperative
case as Pf reaches the constraint α = 0.1. Through this result,
we can clearly see the limitations that the detection-false alarm
probabilities trade off for CSS imposes on the coalition size
and network structure. Also, in Fig. 10, we show that, albeit
the upper bound on coalition size Mmax increases drastically
as Pf becomes smaller, the average maximum coalition size
achieved by the proposed algorithms does not exceed 5 SUs
per coalition for CF and 3 SUs per coalition for CF-PD. This
result shows that the network structure is composed of a large
number of small coalitions rather than a small number of
large coalitions, especially for CF-PD, even when Pf is small
and the collaboration possibilities are high. In this context,
for CF-PD, the average and average maximum coalition sizes
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Fig. 10. Maximum and average coalition size versus non-cooperative false
alarm Pf (or energy detection threshold λ) for CF and CF-PD for N =
50 SUs.
are smaller than for CF, since in CF-PD, once a coalition
achieves the detection probability χ, no further collaboration
is required.
In Fig. 11, for CF and CF-PD (with χ = 95%) we show,
over a period of 10 minutes, the frequency in terms of merge-
and-split and adjust operations per minute for various speeds
of the SUs in a mobile cognitive network with N = 50 SUs
and Pf = 0.01. As the velocity increases, the frequency of
all operations increases for both CF and CF-PD due to the
changes in the network structure incurred by mobility. The
CF algorithm incurs a higher frequency of merge-and-split
than CF-PD since, in the CF, the SUs seek to minimize their
probabilities of miss with no constraints. In contrast, the CF-
PD presents a significantly smaller frequency of merge-and-
split operations, since the SUs, once they form a winning
coalition, are no longer interested in participating in the merge-
and-split operations. However, the CF-PD complements this
lower number of merge-and-split operations with a number
of adjust operations, needed in order to form MWCs out of
winning coalitions. Finally, the frequency of all operations
(merge, split and adjust) for CF-PD is comparable to the
frequency of merge-and-split in CF at almost all velocities.
However, CF-PD possesses a lower complexity as the adjust
rule has a complexity smaller than merge or split.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced a novel and distributed model for
performing collaborative sensing in cognitive radio networks.
In the proposed model, a network of SUs can interact and form
cooperating coalitions for improving their spectrum sensing
performance. We modeled the problem as a coalitional game
with non-transferable utility and derived distributed algorithms
for coalition formation. First, we proposed a distributed coali-
tion formation (CF) algorithm based on two rules of merge and
split that enable SUs in a cognitive network to collaborate and
maximize the probability of detecting the PU presence while
accounting for the costs in terms of false alarm probability.
We characterized the network structure resulting from the pro-
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Fig. 11. Frequency of merge-and-split operations per minute (for CF and
CF-PD) and adjust operations per minute (for CF-PD) achieved over a period
of 10 minutes for different velocities for N = 50 SUs and Pf = 0.01.
posed algorithm as well as studied and proved its various prop-
erties. We further complemented the proposed algorithm with
an adjunct coalitional voting game for providing distributed
coalition formation with detection probability guarantees (CF-
PD) when such detection probabilities are imposed by the PU.
Simulation results showed that the CF algorithm reduces the
average probability of miss per SU up to 88.45% compared to
the non-cooperative case while the CF-PD algorithm enables
up to 87.25% of the SUs to achieve the required detection
probability while forming minimal winning coalitions. The
results also showed how, through the proposed algorithms,
the SUs can self-organize and adapt the network structure to
environmental changes such as mobility.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider two SUs having non-cooperative probabilities of
miss Pm,i and Pm,j , respectively, such that Pm,i ≤ Pm,j . In
this case, if and when coalition S = {i, j} forms, then SU i
is the coalition head as per Convention 1 and we have
Qm,S=Pm,i[Pm,j(1 − Pe,j,i)+(1− Pm,j)Pe,j,i], (15)
Qf,S=1− [(1− Pf )[(1 − Pf )(1 − Pe,j,i)+PfPe,j,i]] . (16)
By virtue of Property 1, the payoffs of the SUs i and j if
S forms are given by, φi(S) = φj(S) = v(S). In order for
the merge between SUs i and j to occur (for forming S) we
must have S ⊲ {{i}, {j}}. Using the Pareto order, and given
that v({i}) ≥ v({j}), S ⊲ {{i}, {j}} translates into φi(S) =
v(S) > v({i}) ≥ v({j}). After algebraic manipulations and
using the expressions of v({i}) and v(S) in (6), we obtain
D · Pe,j,i + C
α2
≤ log
(
1−
(
A · Pe,j,i +B
α
)2)
, (17)
with Pe,j,i the probability of error between the two SUs, and
A=(2Pf − 1)(Pf − 1), B=Pf (2−Pf ), C=Pm,i(Pm,j − 1)+(
α2 · log
(
1−
(
Pf
α
)2))
and D=Pm,i(1− 2Pm,j).
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The inequality in (17) is a transcendental inequality that ad-
mits only a numerical (graphical) solution, with no analytical
expression [49]. The numerical solution (by solution we imply
the range of Pe,j,i that satisfy the inequality) can be derived
by plotting both sides of the equation as a function of Pe,j,i.
A sufficient approximate solution (i.e. approximate range of
Pe,j,i that satisfy the inequality) for (17) is found by solving
D · P¯e,j,i + C
α2
≤ log
(
1−
(
A · Pe,j,i +B
α
)2)
, (18)
where P¯e,j,i is the value that maximizes D·Pe,j,i+Cα2 (since
the probability of error is bounded, this maximum is finite)
and which directly depends on the sign of D. By algebraic
manipulation, (18) yields a quadratic inequality in Pe,j,i
A2P 2e,j,i + (2AB)Pe,j,i +B
2 + α2(e(
C+P¯e,j,iD
α2
) − 1) ≤ 0,
(19)
with discriminant ∆ = A2α2(1−e(
C+P¯e,j,iD
α2
)). We distinguish
two cases depending on the sign of D=Pm,i(1− 2Pm,j).
Case 1: D ≥ 0, that is Pm,j ≤ 12 . First, we note that: (i) Pf
which depends solely on the detection threshold λ is generally
chosen relatively small compared to 1 (a typical value is 0.01),
and (ii) the inequality (17) admits a solution if and only if
A·Pe,j,i+B < α (otherwise the right hand side of (17) goes to
−∞). A direct result of (ii) is that any solution P˜e,j,i for (17)
cannot exceed α−B
A
. By using (i), we have that A ≈ 1 and B ≈
0, hence, any solution P˜e,j,i can be approximately bounded by
P˜e,j,i ≤ α, and thus, the probability of error P¯e,j,i = α. In this
case, ∆ is always positive. After manipulation (1−e(
C+αD
α2
)) >
0 yields
Pm,i(1−Pm,j)+Pm,i(2Pm,j − 1)>α
2 log (1−
P 2f
α2
). (20)
The RHS is always negative (barrier function [27]). The LHS
can be shown to be always positive since otherwise, we need
Pm,i(1−Pm,j)+αPm,i(2Pm,j−1) < 0 which yields two cases
Pmj >
α−1
2α−1 ≥ 1 if α < 0.5 or Pmj <
α−1
2α−1 ≤ 0 if α > 0.5
that are both impossible for 0 ≤ Pm,j ≤ 1 (probability of
miss). Hence, when Pm,j ≤ 12 , (18) admits two roots
P˜e,j,i =
(−B + α
√
(1− e(
C+αD
α2
)))
A
,
P˜
′
e,j,i =
(−B − α
√
(1− e(
C+αD
α2
)))
A
. (21)
Or P˜ ′e,j,i < 0 (A > 0 due to (i)). Consequently, the
solution of (19) is Pe,j,i ≤ P˜e,j,i where P˜e,j,i is given by
(after algebraic manipulation and substituting A,B,C, and D
for their values)
P˜e,j,i =
Pf (Pf − 2) + α
√
(1− (1−
P 2
f
α2
)e
Pm,i(1−α)(Pm,j−1)
α2 )
(2Pf − 1)(Pf − 1)
.
(22)
The solution Pe,j,i ≤ P˜e,j,i with P˜e,j,i in (22) provides a
sufficient analytical approximation for the solution (range of
probabilities) of the initial transcendental inequality in (17)
when Pm,j ≤ 12 .
Case 2: D < 0, that is Pm,j > 12 . In this case, we can easily
see that P¯e,1,2 = 0, and it is easily seen that the discriminant
∆ is positive. By following a reasoning analogous to Case 1,
we find that the sufficient analytical approximation is Pe,j,i ≤
P˜e,j,i with P˜e,j,i given by
P˜e,j,i =
Pf (Pf − 2) + α
√
(1− (1−
P 2
f
α2
)e
Pm,i(Pm,j−1)
α2 )
(2Pf − 1)(Pf − 1)
.
(23)
We cam combine these two cases into one solution, that is
Pe,j,i ≤ P˜e,j,i with
P˜e,j,i=
Pf (Pf − 2)+α
√
(1− (1−
P 2
f
α2
)e
Pm,i(1−η)(Pm,j−1)
α2 )
(2Pf − 1)(Pf − 1)
,
(24)
with η = α, if Pm,j ≤ 12 and η = 0 otherwise.
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